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Abstract 
Oligopoly behaviour by domestic firms faced with foreign competition in 
a small open economy is examined in the context of a market for 
differentiated products. Market power is measured using conjectural 
variations, distinguishing two models of oligopoly based alternatively on 
Cournot and Bertrand behaviour. This leads to the econometric 
specification of price-cost margin, import share and budget share 
equations consistent with an oligopoly equilibrium that encompasses 
both models. The resulting regression model is applied to quarterly data 
covering the period from 1984 to 2000 for each of the two-digit 




Over the past three decades, the theory of international trade has been 
revolutionized as the traditional assumption of universal perfect competition has been 
replaced by imperfect competition, at least in product markets (see Helpmann and 
Krugman, 1985; Krugman, 1994). Yet, empirical studies of trade flows still explicitly or 
implicitly assume perfect competition in product markets. We address this disjuncture 
using an econometric specification of import flows into a small open economy that 
explicitly incorporates imperfect competition by domestic producers of import-competing 
products. This specification leads to a system of equations including a price-cost margin 
equation, a domestic producer-share equation and an industry budget-share equation. We 
then apply the econometric specification to estimate the demand for imports of consumer 
non-durable goods into Australia, along with the pricing behaviour of domestic 
producers. 
We develop our approach from the large body of econometric models of pricing 
by domestic producers faced with import competition (see Caves 1989). Particularly 
relevant are models of pricing in small open economies that treat import prices as 
exogenously determined, but where domestic products are imperfect substitutes for 
imports and where domestic producers are modelled as a non-cooperative oligopoly. In 
this literature, there are a number of studies that assume domestic producers have 
conjectures about the quantity reactions of rivals (Cournot conjectures), such as Lyons 
(1981) and Stålhammer (1991). Other studies assume that domestic producers have 
conjectures about the price reactions of rivals (Bertrand conjectures), such as Bloch 
(1992), Allen (1998) and Olive (2002).  We use an econometric specification that 
encompasses both Cournot and Bertrand conjectures.  
We follow Kohli (1982 and 1983), and many subsequent studies of demand for 
imports as intermediate products, by using an econometric specification derived from 
assuming maximizing behaviour by both consumers and producers. However, we focus 
on differentiated finished goods and use a CES utility function with composite goods and 
nested preferences. The utility function is of the form introduced by Spence (1976) and 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). We employ the simplest possible assumption regarding 
production technology by treating domestic producer as facing constant marginal costs. 
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Our assumptions are quite restrictive, but nonetheless the results illustrate the potential 
gains from empirical work employing econometric specifications with a coherent 
theoretical basis. 
Our econometric specification for each industry contains three equations, a price-
cost margin equation for domestic producers, an equation for the domestic producer share 
of industry sales and an equation for sales of the industry product as a share of total sales 
for domestic manufacturing. Estimation over the three equations is carried out 
alternatively using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) and three-stage least squares 
(3SLS), with the latter method allowing for the possibility of endogenous explanatory 
variables. Estimation is carried out with quarterly data covering the period from 1986 to 
2000 for the three manufacturing industries at the two-digit level in the Australian New 
Zealand Industrial Classification (ANZIC) system that produce primarily consumer non-
durable goods. These are ‘Food, Beverages and Tobacco’, ‘Textiles, Clothing, Footwear 
and Leather’ and ‘Printing, Publishing and Recorded Media’. 
Section 2 below presents our model of consumer and producer behaviour. Section 
3 outlines the econometric specification, while Section 4 describes the data and Section 5 
contains the estimation results. We conclude with some comments on the findings and on 
the implications of our approach for further research on estimating pricing and trade 
flows under conditions of imperfect competition. 
 
2. Modelling Consumer and Producer Behaviour 
2.1 Consumers 
The consumer demand function is derived from a CES (constant elasticity of 
substitution) utility function, with consumers assumed to have nested preferences over 
composite goods. The convexity of indifference surfaces of a conventional utility 
function defined over the quantities of all potential commodities embodies the desirability 
of variety in the choice of differentiated goods.1  
At the top level, consumer demand is derived from a general type of CES utility 
function over m composite consumption goods: 
                                                 
























ii cc         (1) 
In (1), αi is the weight of consumption good i consumed, which over all i add up to unity. 
σ is the substitution elasticity between the m consumption goods.  
Using an “Armington”-type assumption, the second level of the nesting assumes 































σ ββ    (2) 
In (2) βi gives the weight of domestic goods in determining the ‘quantity’ of composite 
good, where 0 ≤ βi ≤ 1. At the two extreme points, β i = 0 specifies that good i is a pure 
import good, while β i = 1 specifies good i is only sourced domestically. In the 
intermediate case, where 0 < βi < 1, good i is both imported and domestically produced. 
The elasticity of substitution between domestically produced and imported composite 
goods is denoted by σdf,i.  
 Finally, at the third level of the nesting, the composite domestic and foreign goods 




































































σγ       (4) 
In (3), cd,ij is domestically produced variety j of good i, cf,ik is imported variety k of good 
i. σd,i is the substitution elasticity among domestically produced varieties of good i. σf,i is 
its foreign counterpart. For a particular variety to be consumed, we have, γd,ij > 0 and γf,ik 
> 0, for domestic and foreign varieties, respectively. 
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The consumer demand function derived for domestic firm j in industry i is 











































,,     (5) 
The parameters, γd,ij , βi  and αi, are the weight of domestic consumption variety ij in the 
domestic composite good, the weight of all domestic varieties in the composite good of 
industry i, and the weight of industry i in total utility, respectively. pd,ij is the “own” price 
charged by firm ij, pd,i  is a price index of prices charged by all domestic producers of  i, 
pi is a price index incorporating all domestic and all foreign producers of i, and p is the 
overall price index generating real income y. 
 
2.2 Producers 
We assume, for tractability, the simplest possible cost conditions, namely constant 
short-run marginal cost. The marginal cost of the domestic producer j is given by a linear 
combination of wage and material unit cost as follows: 
 
 ( )Midijmdidijldijd PaWaMC ,,,,, +=       (6) 
 
In (6), W and PPM are the nominal wage rate and the price of materials, respectively, while 
a  and a  give the unit labour and materials requirements, respectively. Marginal 
cost in (6) is linear homogenous in output and additive in input prices weighted by the 




The analysis centres on two cases. In the first case, the reaction is assumed to be 
in the form of output reactions, which includes the polar case of Cournot conjectures. In 
the second case, other firms are assumed to react in terms of a price response, which 
includes the polar case of Bertrand conjectures. 
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 Domestic firms maximize profits, where the operating profit of firm ij is defined 
as follows: 
 
 ( )[ ]ijdMidimdidildijdijdij cPaWacp ,,,,,,, +−≡π    (7) 
 
The following relation between price and marginal cost then gives first-order condition 















11,         (8) 
 
In (8), εij is the perceived elasticity of demand facing firm ij, and MCij is short-run 
marginal cost.3 Firm ij’s perceived elasticity, εij, incorporates its expectations regarding 
the response of rivals to changes in its own price or quantity. The influence of production 
costs on the domestic price in (8) is direct, while the influence of other factors, including 
the influence of domestic and foreign competition, occurs implicitly through the 
perceived price elasticity of demand.  
Since the emphasis of this paper is empirical, we use the conjectural variation 
approach to model the reactions of competitors. The use of conjectural variations 
parameters allows a straightforward meaning to the degree of competition in an industry 
and also allows different models to be analysed within the same unifying framework 
(Dixit, 1986, p. 107). Bloch and Heijdra (1994) show that the perceived price elasticity 
under Cournot conjectures, εij (CCE), and Bertrand conjectures, εij (BCE), are given by: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 A particular production function that yields a short-run marginal cost function in the 
form of (6) is the Leontief, or fixed coefficients, functional form (see Chong 2002, 43-
44). 
3 We assume that the firm has no storage opportunity, so production always equals 
demand. Given this assumption in deriving the pricing behaviour for firms, we apply the 
resulting econometric specification to only non-durable goods and exclude consideration 
of durable goods industries. 
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( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( )[ ]ijdiijdidiidfidididij SSSSSBCE ,,,,,,, 111 −+×−−−−+−= θσσσσε  (10) 
 
In (9) and (10), Sd,ij is the revenue share of domestic firm ij in total revenue of industry i, 
Sd,i is the revenue share of domestically produced composite good i in total spending on 
good i, and Si is the budget share of composite good i in total spending, In (9), ξi is the 
conjectural quantity-reaction elasticity, while in (10), θi is the conjectural price-reaction 
























ξ =   1,0 ≤≤≠ iikj ξθ   (11) 
 
3. Econometric Specifications 
This paper concentrates on the empirical analysis over time of domestic producer 
pricing and the share of imports. Industry structure and the conjectural elasticities are 
assumed to be constant. Further, symmetric equilibrium is adopted for simplicity. This 
symmetry assumption implies that each firm in an industry faces the same elasticity of 
demand for its product and the same short-run marginal cost (MC). 
 Following Cowling and Waterson (1976), under the assumption of symmetry, the 
identical price-cost margin to achieve a profit maximum for each firm j in industry i 













≡        (12) 
                                                 
4 This paper invokes the semi-small country assumption, which in the present context 
means that the conjectural reaction coefficients of foreign competitors are assumed to be 
zero. Domestic producers react to domestic and foreign rivals, but foreign producers only 
react to foreign rivals. From an econometric perspective this effectively makes the 
foreign prices exogenous. 
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Substituting from the expression in (9) for the unobservable elasticity value in (12) gives 
an econometric specification for the price-cost margin in terms of the observable shares 
for the case of Cournot conjectural variations as follows: 
 
 idiiiiii SSSPCM ,,2,1,0 *ωωω ++=       (13) 
 
For Bertrand case, price-cost margin is a non-linear function of the shares given by:5  
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 idiiiiii SSSPCM ,,2,1,0 *δδδ ++=       (15) 
 
Each oligopoly model leads to the prediction that the coefficient of the domestic 
producer share of industry output, Si, is positive, provided that the elasticity of 
substitution between domestic and foreign varieties exceeds the corresponding elasticity 
between the industry’s product and those of other industries (see the Appendix for 
details). However, the two cases of conjectural variations can be distinguished 
empirically by the sign of the relationship between the price-cost margin and the variable 
for the product of budget share for the industry, Si, and the domestic producer share of the 
industry, Sd,i. In the Cournot case this relationship is predicted to be negative, while in the 
Bertrand case it is predicted to be positive.6  
                                                 
5 Details of this derivation and those below are given in the Appendix. 
6 An increase in the elasticity of substitution between consumption goods, σ, lowers the 
price-cost margin under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. However, in the Cournot 
case this relationship involves having the price-cost margin negatively related to the 
inverse of the elasticity, while in the Bertrand case the relationship is positive. 
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The domestic producer share of industry i as derived from the demand function in 











































=       (16) 
 
Likewise, the budget share for the industry in terms of the ratio of domestic producer 
price index for industry i to the general price index, 
P

















S idii         (17) 
 
4. Data and Estimation Strategy 
The model set out above is applied to quarterly data over 1984 (first quarter) to 
2000 (first quarter) covering manufacturing industries at the two-digit classification level 
in the Australia and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC). Only 
industries producing primarily consumer non-durable goods are included in the 
estimation, as the demand model outlined above is based on consumer decision making 
for currently consumed goods. The included industries are ‘Food, Beverage and Tobacco’ 
(Industry 21), ‘Textile, Clothing, Footwear and Leather (Industry 22) and ‘Printing, 
Publishing and Recorded Music’ (Industry 24). 
For simplicity in reporting results without excessive subscripts, the domestic 
producer share is denoted, PRS, the budget share of the industry is denoted, IRS, and the 
product of these of shares is denoted, PDT. Further, the ratio of foreign to domestic 
industry price is denoted, PFPD, and the ratio of the domestic industry price to the 
general price index is denoted, PDP. Measures for the price-cost margin (PCM), domestic 
producer share of industry sales, PRS, the industry share of total expenditure, IRS, and 
the relative price measures, PFPD and PDP, are constructed using data from the 
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Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). The particular publication sources and methods 
are described in the Data Appendix.  
As is now standard in studies using time-series data, the time series are each 
tested for the existence of a unit root. The results are presented in Table 1. The t-statistic 
of the last included lag is presented under the value of the DF or ADF statistic. Also 
shown is the value of the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for auto-correlation and the lag 
length for the DF or ADF test. The criterion for selecting lag length is “testing down” 
from 5 lags. By dropping one lag, a F-statistic is calculated for the exclusion of the lag 
and the existence of autocorrelation associated with each lag is also taken into 
consideration. The “D” notation in front of the variables indicates that the first difference 
of the variable is being used. 
 
Table 1: Unit Root Tests  for Price-Cost Margin 
Food, Beverage and Tobacco 
(Industry 21) 
Textile, Clothing, Footwear and 
Leather (Industry 22) 
Printing, Publishing and 
Recorded Media (Industry 24) 
Variables 
DF/ADF 








LM test for 
Auto-correlation 
AR [1-4] 




































































































































* Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level test 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level test 
 
 10
The DF and ADF statistics reported in Table 1 show that the hypothesis of a unit 
root cannot be rejected for any of the original data series, with the exception of the PDT 
series for ‘Textile, Clothing, Footwear and Leather’, for which a unit root is rejected at 
the five percent significance level. In contrast, testing the first difference of each series 
leads to rejection of the hypothesis of a unit root at either the five percent level or the one 
percent level. This indicates that the series generally are I(1) variables, since the data in 
levels exhibit non-stationarity while the first differences are stationary.7 Hence, the 
estimation in the next section is based on differenced data to avoid spurious relationships.  
 
5. Results 
The full model that is estimated below consists of an equation for the domestic 
producer share of industry sales (domestic share), as in (16), an equation for the industry 
share of consumer expenditures (budget share), as in (17), and an encompassing PCM 
equation, which is in the form of both (13) and (15). Seasonal dummy variables and a 
time trend are initially added to each equation. The PCM equation is linear in (13) and 
(15) and is estimated in that form. However, the share equations are non-linear in (16) 
and (17), so they are transformed to yield linear relationships. In particular, the budget-
share equation is transformed by taking logarithms of both sides, which yields a linear 
equation between the logarithm of the budget share, denoted by LIRS, and the logarithm 
of the ratio of the domestic producer price index to the general price index, denoted by 
LPDP. A more complex transformation of the domestic share equation is required, which 
is set out in the Appendix and results in a linear equation between the transformed 
domestic producer share variable, denoted by S, and the transformed ratio of domestic 
producer price to import price, denoted by RP. 
Up to five lags are included for each independent variable together with the 
seasonal dummies. The data are used in first differences as discussed above, which is 
denoted by a D in place of each variable name. Thus, the constant term provides an 
estimate of the time trend in the relationships. After transformation to linear equations for 
                                                 
7 Since price-cost margin is bounded between zero and one, a non-stationarity property is 
not sensible from a theoretical standpoint. However, given the small sample period of 63 
quarters, the ADF test is weak. 
 11



































−−   (20) 
 
Equations (19) and (20) provide estimates for transformed share variables, which 
appear in their original form in the price-cost margin equation. Further, the domestic 
producer price varies with the price-cost margin when the level of unit direct cost is 
given. As a result, the price-cost margin affects the share equations indirectly. Thus, the 
price-cost margin equation and the two share equations constitute a potentially 
interdependent system for estimation purposes. Estimation is carried out using 
alternatively seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) and three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
regression. In each case, insignificant lags and seasonal dummies are dropped. 
Table 2 presents the results from estimating equations (18) to (20) for Food, 
Beverage and Tobacco Manufacturing (Industry 21). The F-statistic with SUR estimation 
for each equation is statistically significant at the one percent level, suggesting a fair 
degree of explanatory power. There is no corresponding test for the 3SLS estimates, but 
the standard errors of estimate are comparable to those from SUR estimation. The DW 
statistic suggests no evidence of autocorrelation in the residuals. Finally, the share and 








































 Seemingly Unrelated Regression Three-Stage Least Squares 
Coefficient DPCM21 DS21 DLIRS21 DPCM21 DS21 DLIRS21 






















       
jt
a −,2   1.0299 [lag 4] [2.9195***] 
-1.8438 [lag 1] 
[-4.3790***] 
 
-1.7225 [lag 5] 
[-3.7000***] 
 0.99675 [lag 4] 
[2.707***] 
-1.8824 [lag 1] 
[-4.382***] 
 
-1.8198 [lag 5] 
[-2.757***] 
 
       
3a  0.45464 [1.9685*] 
  0.59549 
[2.328**] 
  
       
5a    -0.10343 [-10.7570***] 
  -0.10450 
[-10.74***] 
       
6a    -0.12490 [-12.7553***] 
  -0.12428 
[-12.70***] 
       
7a    -0.054404 [-5.5667***] 
  -0.055502 
[-5.653***] 
       
F-Statistic 3.1606** 3.9946** 23.8562***    
DW-Statistic 2.1424 2.4853 1.8927    
S.E. of Regression 0.015122 0.070103 0.031430 0.015040 0.068205 0.029279 
       
Note: 57 observations used for estimation from 1986Q1 to 2000Q1 
t-ratios are in parentheses. 
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level of test statistic. 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level of test statistic. 
*** Indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level of test statistic. 
 
 
The implications of the results for the elasticity of substitution and price elasticity 
of import and domestic demand for Industry 21 are discussed below together with those 
for the other industries. Here we focus on the specific results relating to firm behaviour. 
First, it should be noted that there is evidence against perfectly competitive behaviour in 
the industry. The price-cost margin is dependent on market shares only under imperfect 
competition. For Industry 21, the price-cost margin regression results indicate a 
statistically significant relationship between the margin and the multiplicative share 
variable, DPDT, but no consistent sign or statistical significance for the coefficients of 
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the domestic producer share variable. A positive coefficient for DPDT, as found in both 
the SUR and 3SLS results is expected in the case of a Bertrand-type oligopoly with price 
conjectures. In the SUR estimates the coefficient of DPDT is positive and is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level. In the 3SLS estimates, DPDT also has a positive 
relationship with PCM, and it is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. With this 
congruence, the results for Food, Beverage and Tobacco Manufacturing suggest that there 
is firm behaviour based on oligopoly with price conjectures. 
Table 3 presents the results from estimating equations (18) to (20) for Textile, 
Clothing, Footwear and Leather Manufacturing (Industry 22). The F-statistic with SUR 
estimation for each equation is statistically significant at the one percent level, suggesting 
a fair degree of explanatory power as with Industry 21. For the 3SLS estimates, the 
standard errors of estimate are comparable to those from SUR estimation, except for a 
substantially higher standard error in the PCM equation. The DW statistic suggests no 
evidence of autocorrelation in the residuals of the PCM equation, but some evidence for 
the two share equations. Also, worrying for interpretation of the share equations is that 
none of the relative price variables have coefficients that are statistically significant, with 
only the constant (representing the time trend) and the seasonal dummies having 
statistically significant coefficients in either the SUR or 3SLS estimates. Thus, there are 
several reasons for treating the results from this industry with extreme caution.  
With regard to indication of firm behaviour, both the SUR and 3SLS results 
suggest a deviation from perfectly competition, as there are statistically significant 
coefficients for share variables in both cases. However, the results are not supportive of 
either Cournot-type or Bertrand-type behaviour. The coefficients of the domestic share 
variable in both the SUR and 3SLS results are negative and statistically significant at the 
one percent level, contrary to the expectation of a positive sign. Further the sign of the 
DPDT variable differs between SUR and 3SLS. The SUR estimate of the coefficient of 
PDT is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level, suggesting that firms 
behave with price conjectures as in Industry 21. However, the corresponding estimate 
from 3SLS, which allows for the possible endogeneity of the share variables, is negative 
and also significant at the one percent level, suggesting firms behave with quantity 
conjectures. In view of the statistical problems with the estimates that are noted above, it 
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seems best to conclude that the model does not produce reliable results for Textiles, 
Clothing, Footwear and Leather Manufacturing. 
 
Table 3: SUR and 3SLS Estimates for Textile, Clothing, Footwear and Leather 



































 Seemingly Unrelated Regression Three-Stage Least Squares 
Coefficient DPCM22 DS22 DLIRS22 DPCM22 DS22 DLIRS22 






















       
jt
a −,2         
       
3a  2.7556 [2.8673***] 
  -36.007 
[-5.192***] 
  
       







       








       







       
F-Statistic 12.5834*** 33.6811*** 61.8254***    
DW-Statistic 1.9845 2.4195 2.4678    
S.E. of Regression 0.020469 0.11005 0.047196 0.13848 0.10563 0.046605 
       
Note: 57 observations used for estimation from 1986Q1 to 2000Q1 
t-ratios are in parentheses. 
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level of test statistic. 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level of test statistic. 
*** Indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level of test statistic. 
 
Table 4 presents the results from estimating equations (18) to (20) for Printing, 
Publishing and Recorded Media (Industry 24). The F-statistic with SUR estimation for 
each equation is only statistically significant at the one percent level for the industry 
share equation, suggesting that the full model does not fit well in Industry 24.8 The DW 
                                                 
8 The SHAZAM regression program does not provide an F-statistic value for the PCM 
equation, which suggests that this value is implausible (eg negative), as is possible when 
systems of equations are estimated with maximum likelihood methods. 
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statistic for the producer share equation provides evidence of autocorrelation, but there is 
no such evidence for the PCM and the industry share equations. Also, worrying for 
interpretation of the producer share equation is that none of the relative price variables 
have coefficients that are statistically significant. In the industry share equation there are 
significant coefficients on relative price variables, but the sign of the current relative 
price changes between the SUR and 3SLS estimates. Thus, as with Industry 22, there are 
several reasons for treating the results from this industry with extreme caution.  
 




































 Seemingly Unrelated Regression Three-Stage Least Squares 
Coefficient DPCM24 DS24 DLIRS24 DPCM24 DS24 DLIRS24 






















       
jt
a −,2    0.81453 [lag 3] [1.9986*] 
  1.2512 [lag 3] 
[2.240**] 
 
       
3a  -5.2472 [-3.1612***] 
  -1.0361 
[-0.1844] 
  
       











       
6a    -0.033717 [-3.0886***] 
  -0.034797 
[-2.569***] 
       








       
F-Statistic None 1.9896 7.4014***    
DW-Statistic 2.1406 2.8083 1.9855    
S.E. of Regression 0.033643 0.11825 0.040727 0.042886 0.11449 0.048106 
       
Note: 57 observations used for estimation from 1986Q1 to 2000Q1 
t-ratios are in parentheses. 
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level of test statistic. 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level of test statistic. 




With regard to indication of firm behaviour, both the SUR and 3SLS results again 
suggest a deviation from perfect competition, as there are statistically significant 
coefficients for share variables in both cases. As in Industry 22, the coefficients of the 
domestic producer share variable are negative and statistically significant, contradicting 
the prediction of both oligopoly models. The SUR estimate of the coefficient of DPDT is 
negative and statistically significant at the one percent level, suggesting that firms behave 
with quantity conjectures. However, the corresponding estimate from 3SLS, which allows 
for the possible endogeneity of the share variables, while negative is not statistically 
significant. Thus, the evidence of Cournot-type behaviour is weak at best. 
An advantage of using estimating equations derived from a model of consumer 
and producer behaviour is that values of the underlying parameters determining 
behaviour can be obtained from the estimated coefficients in the regression equations. For 
the model used here, particular parameters of interest are the two measures of elasticity of 
substitution from the CES utility function. These are of interest in their own right and 
because they can be used to generate estimates of the price elasticity of demand and enter 
into calculation of estimates of the conjectural elasticity for either the Bertrand-type or 
Cournot-type model of oligopoly. The estimated coefficient of the DRP in the domestic 
producer share equation is equal to one minus idf ,σ , the elasticity of substitution between 
domestic and imported product varieties. Likewise, the estimated coefficient of DLPDP 
in the industry share equation is equal to one minus σ , the elasticity of substitution 
between the industry product and those of other manufacturing industries.  
Values of the conjectural elasticities for producers can also be calculated from the 
regression results. Indeed, the values of the conjectural elasticity for either oligopoly 
model are over-identified. The most direct estimate of the conjectural elasticity is 
obtained from the estimated coefficient of DPDT together with the value for σ . A second 
estimate is obtained from the coefficient of DPRS together with values for both idf ,σ  and  
σ . The calculation differs depending on whether the oligopoly model of Cournot-type or 
Bertrand-type is relevant. The equation for the relationship between the coefficient of 
each variable, DPDT and DPRS, and the conjectural elasticity is given for each oligopoly 
model in the Appendix. 
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 The calculated value of the each elasticity of substitution is shown in Table 5. A 
positive value suggests that products are substitutes, while a negative value suggests the 
products are complements. In the underlying consumer demand model, we assume that 
all products are substitutes, so the negative values in Table 5 suggest that the consumer 
demand model may not fit at least some aspects of behaviour in these industries. Further, 
our sign prediction for the domestic producer share variable in the equation for the price-
cost margin are based on the assumption that the elasticity of substitution between 
domestic and foreign varieties within an industry is more positive than that between the 
industry’s aggregate product and that of other industries. A common problem in working 
with data at this high level of aggregation is that substantial amounts of imports may be 
intermediate products, even in these consumer goods industries (for example, 
unprocessed foodstuffs used in further manufacturing). Strong substitutability is indicated 
only in Food, Beverage and Tobacco Manufacturing, with large positive estimates of σ , 
the elasticity of substitution between the industry’s aggregate product and the products of 
all other industries. Even here, the ordering of the elasticities is contrary to assumptions, 
as the estimates for idf ,σ  are negative, rather than more positive than the estimates of σ . 
 Values of the conjectural elasticity derived from each the coefficients for both 
DPRS and DPDT for each estimation method, SUR and 3SLS, are also shown in Table 5. 
If the estimated coefficient of DPDT is positive, the values are listed as being values for 
the price conjectural elasticity, ξ, while if the coefficient of DPDT is negative, the values 
are listed as values of the quantity conjectural elasticity, θ. The usual expectation for the 
values of a conjectural elasticity is between zero (for either the pure Cournot model in the 
case of quantity conjectures or the pure Bertrand model in the case of price conjectures) 
and one (for the case of implicit collusion). Estimates close to falling within these bounds 
are found only for the Food, Beverage and Tobacco Industry, the only industry for which 
the regressions results pass the usual diagnostic statistical tests and yield coefficient 
estimates generally consistent with the restrictions of the underlying consumer and 
producer behaviour assumptions. Ignoring the anomalous result for the 3SLS estimation 
of the coefficient of DPRS, the values for this industry suggest behaviour that is close to 
that of implicit collusion. 
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Table 5: Calculated Values of the Elasticity of Substitution 
Industry/ 
Parameters 
Food, Beverage and 
Tobacco Manufacturing 
Textile, Clothing, 
















       













       





       




[SUR] na na na 
       





       




[SUR] na na na 
       
       
 
 
 The values of the elasticity of substitution from Table 5 can be used together with 
mean values of the variables to calculate the price elasticity of demand, specifically the 
price elasticity for import demand and for domestic industry demand.9 Table 6 lists the 
values of the price elasticity of import demand and domestic producer demand that are 
calculated from the elasticity of substitution values in Table 5. Two values of the import 
demand elasticity are given. When import prices change, this has a direct effect on import 
demand and an indirect effect through changes in domestic producer prices (through the 
PCM equation). The value of 1fε  is calculated as the direct impact of import price on 
imports through the domestic producer share equation along with the indirect effect on 
domestic producer prices in the same equation. The value of 2fε  includes these effects 
plus the impact of the change in domestic producer price in the industry share equation, 
so this measure is in a sense a more inclusive measure of elasticity. 
 
                                                 
9 See Chong (2002, 134-143) for details. 
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Table 6: Calculated Values of the Price Elasticity of Demand 
1fε  2fε  dε  Industry 













0.26 0.91 0.32 1.09 -1.28 -1.02 
 
 
We concentrate the discussion of the value of the estimated price elasticity in 
Food, Beverage and Tobacco Manufacturing (Industry 21), as the results for the other 
industries are noted above as being unreliable due to statistical anomalies. All of the 
values of the price elasticity for Industry 21 are negative, with the demand for imports 
shown as being very price sensitive. The elasticity of demand facing domestic producers 
is much less sensitive, but in the mildly inelastic range generally associated with these 
‘necessity’ products. Interestingly, the price elasticity in the other industries is shown as 
more elastic in spite of the statistical problems with the estimates. Also, it is interesting 
that in each industry the alternative estimation methods have little impact on the 
calculated price elasticity of demand facing domestic producers, even though the 
elasticity of import demand is often substantially different across methods.   
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper uses a structural model to identify consumer demand and oligopoly 
behaviour in Australian consumer non-durable goods manufacturing. This leads to an 
econometric specification with an equation for the industry price-cost margin and two 
revenue-share equations. The econometric specification is the same for each industry, but 
the estimation results suggest important differences exist in the performance of the 
model. 
Satisfactory estimates in terms of statistical properties are obtained only in Food, 
Beverages and Tobacco Manufacturing. The estimates from the equation for the price-
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cost margin in this industry suggest that firms use price conjectures in determining their 
behaviour, as in the Bertrand oligopoly model. Further, the estimates show a high degree 
of substitution between this industry’s product and those of other industries. Finally, the 
implied price elasticity of import demand in this industry is found to be very elastic (on 
the order of –5), but the demand for domestic producers is found to be inelastic (in line 
with estimates generally found for products of this type). 
The results for Textile, Clothing, Footwear and Leather Manufacturing and 
Printing, Publishing and Recorded Music fail key statistical tests. Also, many coefficient 
estimates are inconsistent with predictions based on the underlying model of consumer 
and producer behaviour. It would have been surprising if consumer and producer 
behaviour in all industries followed the pattern set out in our highly restrictive model. 
Also, we work with relatively aggregated data, so a single model may not apply to all the 
products in an industry leading to potential misspecification of the estimating equations. 
This can is a particular problem when some products are delivered to either intermediate 
demand or investment demand.  
The reasonable estimation results for Food, Beverage and Tobacco Manufacturing 
illustrate the potential gains from empirical work employing econometric specifications 
based on explicit models of consumer and producer behaviour. There is clearly much 
opportunity for further research. Alternative models of consumer preferences and firm 
behaviour would lead to alternative estimating equations. Also, work with more 
disaggregated data sets might provide more precise estimates. We encourage other 
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In the PCM equation for the case of quantity conjectures (Cournot case), the ωx,i 



































































* 111 ξξ  
 
In the corresponding case of price conjectures (Bertrand case), the δx,i (x=0,1,2) 
parameters are defined in terms of preference parameters, the reaction elasticity and the 
linearization point as follows: 
( ) ( )[ ]iPCMPCM dfididiii ,2 ,*,2**,0 σσθσδ −+−+≡  
( )σσθδ −≡ idfiii PCM ,*2*,1  
*2*






















* 111 θθ  
 
In order to provide signs for the ωx,i and δx,i parameters, the following assumptions are 
made: 
1. Assumption 1 (Tree Principle): The substitution elasticity increases with the level of 
disaggregation. In the present set-up this implies 0 ≤ σ < σdf,i < σd,i. 
2. Assumption 2 (Proximity Principle): σ/(1-si) < σdf,i and σdf,i/(1-sd,i) < σd,i. 
In the Cournot case, using assumption 1, it is straightforward to derive the 
following comparative static signs:ω0,i > 0, ω1,i > 0, and ω2,i < 0. When assumption 2 also 
holds, the sum of coefficients is restricted with ω1,i + si ω2,i > 0. These predictions are 
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consistent with intuition. The implied value of the price-cost margin in Cournot case is 
guaranteed to be positive for any values of the market share variables. Further, in view of 
the definition of  it is also possible to derive that δPCM*iξ i/δnd,i < 0 and δPCMi/δξi > 0. A 
higher degree of industry concentration  (proxied by a lower nd,i) increases the price-cost 
margin, and a higher reaction elasticity increases the price-cost margin. 
In the Bertrand case, using assumption 1, it is straightforward to derive the 
following comparative static effects: δ0,i > 0, δ1,i > 0, and δ2,i > 0. These predictions 
guarantee a positive implied value of price-cost margin. The signs for the derivatives of 
the price-cost margin with respect to the number of domestic suppliers and the reaction 
elasticity are the same as in the Cournot case. Thus, with either Bertrand or Cournot 
competition, the predictions accord with intuition concerning the relationship between 
price-cost margins and the degree of concentration and recognition of interdependence 
among domestic producers. 
 
 
Transformation to linear equations for PRSi and IRSi 
The price-cost margin is linear in both (13) and (150, but the share equations in 
(16) and (17) are not. The share equations are each linearized to establish a linear system 























































































































































































Taking logarithms of both sides: 






























LnSLnSLn α  
The left-hand side variable is denoted DS and the right hand side variable is denoted 
DRP, thus, DSi = α DRPi. 
The transformation for the equation with the industry share of domestic 
















S idii  
Taking logarithms of both sides of equation (17) gives, 









σαS d,iii ln1lnln  
Differencing, 



























σSS idid-ii  
If the budget share is denoted  IRS and the relative price is denoted PDP, this can be 
expressed as: 
  ii DLPDPcDLIRS 1=
where, 
[ ] [ ]















The price-cost margin is built up from a base PCM for the average value in 1989-
1990.  PCMbase is given by: 
PCMbase = (Value Addedbase – Wagesbase) / Turnoverbase 
Quarterly PCM is then calculated from quarterly indexes of unit cost and domestic 
producer price using the formula: 
PCM = {Price – [(1 – PCMbase) * Unit Cost]} / Price 
Unit cost is calculated as a weighted average of indexes for unit labour cost (a wage 
index divided by an output per employee index) and materials prices. Data on value 
added per person, number of employees, wages and salaries and turnover are taken from 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Catalogue 8221. Data on the price index for output 
are taken from Price Index of Articles Produced by Manufacturing Industry (ABS 
Catalogue 6412. Data on output are for gross added value (chain volume measures) taken 
from ABS 5206. Data on the price of materials are taken from ABS Catalogue 6411. 
Finally, data on the value of purchased materials are taken from ABS Catalogue 8202. 
Quarterly domestic producer revenue share (PRS) is calculated as follows: 
idS , = (sales – export) / (sales – export + import) 
The data on sales in current dollars come from ABS Catalogue 5629, while data on 
imports and exports come from ABS Catalogue 5433 (superseded by ABS Catalogue 
5422) and ABS Catalogue 5432 (superseded by ABS Catalogue 5422), respectively. 
Quarterly industry revenue share (IRS) is calculated as follows: 
dS = (sales + import – export) / Total Manufacturing (sales + import – export) 
The data for total manufacturing are constructed by adding together data for the separate 
two-digit classifications of manufacturing industry. 
The relative price of domestic and foreign product within an industry is calculated 
as follows: 
 PFPD = (import price index) / (domestic price index) 
Further, the relative price for domestic product in an industry to the average price of 
domestic manufactures is calculated as: 
 PDP = (domestic price index) / (general price index) 
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Data for the domestic industry price indexes are taken from, Price Index of Articles 
Produced by Manufacturing Industry (ABS Catalogue 6412), while the import price 
indexes are taken from ABS Catalogue 5414. The general price index for domestic 
manufacturing is constructed as the average of nine manufacturing two-digit 
classifications, each weighted by its share of sales for total manufacturing. 
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